Secure message delivery games for device-to-device communications by Panaousis, Emmanouil et al.
Secure Message Delivery Games for
Device-to-Device Communications
Emmanouil Panaousis1, Tansu Alpcan2,
Hossein Fereidooni3, and Mauro Conti∗3
1 Queen Mary University of London
e.panaousis@qmul.ac.uk
2 The University of Melbourne
tansu.alpcan@unimelb.edu.au
3 University of Padua
{hossein,conti}@math.unipd.it
Abstract. Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is expected to be a
key feature supported by next generation cellular networks. D2D can ex-
tend the cellular coverage allowing users to communicate when telecom-
munications infrastructure are highly congested or absent. In D2D net-
works, any message delivery from a source to a destination relies ex-
clusively on intermediate devices. Each device can run different kinds
of mobile security software, which offer protection against viruses and
other harmful programs by using real-time scanning in every file enter-
ing the device. In this paper, we investigate the best D2D network path
to deliver a potentially malicious message from a source to a destination.
Although our primary objective is to increase security, we also investi-
gate the contribution of energy costs and quality-of-service to the path
selection. To this end, we propose the Secure Message Delivery (SMD)
protocol, whose main functionality is determined by the solution of the
Secure Message Delivery Game (SMDG). This game is played between
the defender (i.e., the D2D network) which abstracts all legitimate net-
work devices and the attacker which abstracts any adversary that can
inject different malicious messages into the D2D network in order, for
instance, to infect a device with malware. Simulation results demon-
strate the degree of improvement that SMD introduces as opposed to a
shortest path routing protocol. This improvement has been measured in
terms of the defender’s expected cost as defined in SMDGs. This cost
includes security expected damages, energy consumption incurred due
to messages inspection, and the quality-of-service of the D2D message
communications.
Keywords: game theory, security, device-to-device communications.4
1 Introduction
Nowadays, the vast demand for anytime-anywhere wireless broadband connectiv-
ity has posed new research challenges. As mobile devices are capable of communi-
cating in both cellular (e.g., LTE) and unlicensed (e.g., IEEE 802.11) spectrum,
4 The original publication is available at www.link.springer.com.
2the Device-to-Device (D2D) networking paradigm has the potential to bring sev-
eral immediate gains. Networking based on D2D communication [1–4] not only
facilitates wireless and mobile peer-to-peer services but also provides energy ef-
ficient communications, locally oﬄoading computation, oﬄoading connectivity
and high throughput.
Another emerging feature of D2D is the establishment and use of multi-hop
paths to enable communications among non-neighboring devices. In multi-hop
D2D communications, messages are delivered from a source to a destination
via intermediate devices, independently of operators’ networks. Relay by device
has been proposed by the Telecommunication Standardization Advisory Group
(TSAG) in the International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Sec-
tor (ITU-T).
A key question in multi-hop D2D networks is, which route should the origi-
nator of a message choose to send it to an intended destination? To motivate the
application of our model, we emphasize in the need for localized applications. In
particular, these applications run in a collaborative manner by groups of devices
at a location where telecommunications infrastructures:
– are not presented at all, e.g., underground stations, airplanes, cruise ships,
parts of a motorway, and mountains;
– have collapsed due to physical damage to the base stations or insufficient
available power, e.g., areas affected by a disaster such as earthquake;
– are over congested due to an extremely crowded network, e.g., for events in
stadiums, and public celebrations.
Furthermore, relay by device can be leveraged for commercial purposes such
as advertisements and voucher distributions for instance in large shopping cen-
ters. This is considered a more efficient way of promoting businesses than other
traditional methods such as email broadcasting and SMS messaging due to the
immediate identification of the clients in a surrounding area. Home automation
and building security are another two areas that multi-hop message delivery us-
ing D2D communications is likely to overtake our daily life in the near future.
Lastly, multi-hop D2D could be leveraged towards the provision of anonymity
against cellular operators as proposed in [12].
Due to the large number of areas D2D communications are applicable to,
devices are likely to be an ideal target for attackers. Malware for mobile de-
vices evolves in the same trend as malware for PCs. It can spread for instance
through a Multimedia Messaging System (MMS) with infected attachments, or
an infected message received via Bluetooth aiming at stealing users’ personal
data or credit stored in the device. An example of a well-known worm that
propagates through Bluetooth was Cabir [7], which consists of a message con-
taining an application file called caribe.sis. Mabir, a variant of Cabir, was
spread also via MMS by sending out copies of itself as a .sis file. Van Ruiten-
beek et al. [8] investigated the effects of MMS viruses that spread by sending
infected messages to other devices. In addition, Bose and Shin [9] examined the
propagation of malware that spread via SMS or MMS messages and short-range
radio interfaces while Polla et al. [10] have made a thorough survey on mobile
malware.
31.1 Contributions
In this paper, we assume that each device has some host-based intrusion detec-
tion capabilities (e.g., antivirus). Therefore, a device would be able to detect
malicious application-level events as in [11]. We assume that each device has
its own detection rate which contributes towards the overall detection rate of
the routes that this device is on. To increase the level of security of a mes-
sage delivery, the route with the highest detection capabilities must be selected
to relay the message to the destination. Apart from security, energy consump-
tion is of crucial importance because devices (e.g., smartphones) usually impose
strict energy constraints. This becomes more important due to the limited CPU
and memory capabilities that devices have, which entail higher energy cost as
opposed to cases where no message inspection takes place.
In this paper, we propose the Secure Message Delivery (SMD) protocol. The
primary objective of this protocol is to choose the most secure path to deliver a
message from a sender to a destination in a multi-hop D2D network. SMD can
work on top of underlying physical and MAC layer protocols [5, 6]. Apart from
security, SMD respects the energy costs and Quality-of-Service (QoS) of each
route. This happens by giving certain weights to each of the involved parameters
(security, energy, QoS) with more emphasis to be put on security.
We formulate Secure Message Delivery Games (SMDGs) in order to derive
an optimal behavior for the SMD. In these games, one or more adversaries,
abstracted by the attacker, aim at increasing the security damage, incurred to the
defender (i.e., network), by injecting malicious messages into the D2D network.
On the other hand, the defender chooses the “best route” for message delivery.
In SMDGs, the utility of the defender is influenced by: (i) the probability of
the delivered message to be correctly classified as malicious or benign before
it is delivered to the intended destination; (ii) the energy cost associated with
message forwarding, and message inspection on relay devices during message
delivery; and (iii) the QoS of the message communications on the chosen D2D
path.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes
the most relevant related work within the intersection of game theory, security
and mobile distributed networking. In Section 3 we present the system model
whilst Section 4 formulates the SMDGs and it provides their solutions. In Section
5 the SMD routing protocol for D2D networks is described. We present some
preliminary simulation results in Section 6 for different number and types of
malicious messages distributions, and different D2D network profiles. Section
7 concludes this paper by summarizing its main contributions, limitations and
highlighting our plans for future work.
2 Related Work
The papers we discuss in this section have used game theory in favor of secu-
rity in mobile distributed networks. These address different challenges including
secure routing and packet forwarding [13,27,29–31], trust establishment [15,27],
intrusion detection [15,21,23,24,26], and optimization of energy costs [17–19,22].
4In [27], Sun et al. presented an information theoretic framework to evaluate
trustworthiness in ad hoc networks and to assist malicious detection and route
selection. According to their mechanism, a source node chooses a route to send
a message to a destination by looking up the packet-forwarding nodes’ trustwor-
thiness, and selecting the most trustworthy route. Yu et al. examined, in [29], the
dynamic interactions between “good” nodes and adversaries in mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs) as secure routing and packet forwarding games. They have
derived optimal defense strategies and studied the maximum potential damage,
which incurs when attackers find a route with maximum number of hops and
they inject malicious traffic into it. Extension of the previous work is presented
in [31], where Yu and Liu examined the issues of cooperation stimulation by
modeling the interactions among nodes as multi-stage secure routing and packet
forwarding games. In [30], the same authors focused on a two-player packet for-
warding game stating that nodes must not help their opponents more than their
opponents has helped them back. Felegyhazi et al. have studied in [13] the Nash
equilibria of packet forwarding strategies with TFT (Tit-For-Tat) punishment
strategy in a repeated game.
In [17], the authors presented a Bayesian hybrid detection approach to pre-
serve the energy spent for intrusion detection. In the proposed static game, the
defender fixes the prior probabilities about the types of his opponent. The dy-
namic game allows the defender to update his belief about his opponent’s type
based on new observed actions and the game history. The authors formulated
the attacker/defender game model in both static and dynamic Bayesian game
contexts, and investigated the equilibrium strategies of the two players. Lui et
al. in [18] put forwarded a more comprehensive game framework and they used
cross-feature analysis on feature vectors constructed from the training data to
determine the actions of a potential attacker in each stage game. They proposed
to use the equilibrium monitoring strategies to operate between a lightweight
IDS and a heavyweight IDS. In [19], Marchang et al. proposed a game-theoretic
model of IDS for MANETs. They have used game theory to model the interac-
tions between the IDS and the attacker to determine whether it is essential to
always keep the IDS running without impacting its effectiveness in a negative
manner.
In [23], Patcha et al. provided a mathematical framework to analyze intru-
sion detection in MANETs. They model the interaction between an attacker
and an individual node as a two player non-cooperative signaling game. The
sender could be a regular or a malicious node. A receiving node equipped with
an intrusion detection system (IDS) detects a “message/attack” with a prob-
ability depending on his belief, and the IDS updates the beliefs according to
this message. However, it is not explained how the IDS updates the beliefs ac-
cording to this message. The same authors have also reinforced the suitability
of using game theory for modeling intrusion detection by giving a theoretically
consistent model in [24]. They used the concept of multi-stage dynamic non-
cooperative game with incomplete information to model intrusion detection in a
network that uses host-based IDSs. A cooperative approach is proposed in [21] by
5Otrok et al. to detect and analyze intrusions in MANETs. The authors used the
Shapley value to analyze the contribution of each node to the network security
and proposed pre-defined security classes to decrease false positives. They also
considered cache poisoning and malicious flooding attacks. Santosh et al. in [26],
employed game theoretic approaches to detect intrusions and identify anomaly
behaviors of nodes in MANETs. The authors aimed at building an IDS based
on a cooperative scheme to detect intrusions in MANETs using game theoretic
concepts.
In [15], Cho et al. developed a mathematical model to analyze and reveal the
optimal rate to perform intrusion detection related tasks. They enhanced the
system reliability of group communication systems in MANETs given informa-
tion regarding operational conditions, system failures, and attacker behaviors.
They have also discussed to prolong the system lifetime and cope with inside at-
tacks. They proposed that intrusion detection should be executed at an optimal
rate to maximize the mean time to failure of the system.
Finally in [22], Panaousis and Politis present a routing protocol that respects
the energy spent by intrusion detectors on each route and therefore prolonging
network lifetime. However, this protocol does not investigate the effect of differ-
ent malicious messages. It rather takes a simplistic approach according to which
the attacker either attacks or not a route.
As we have seen in this section, a substantial amount of game theoretic mod-
els for security in distributed mobile networks (e.g., mobile ad hoc networks)
have been proposed in the literature. However, none of them addresses all as-
pects of security, QoS and energy efficiency at the same time. Motivated by this
observation, our work contributes to the existing literature by bringing together
these three aspects, under a generic but also customizable model provided by
the SMDGs. Furthermore, our work defines the adversary’s pure strategies to be
a set of different malicious messages. And this is not an aspect of investigation
of papers identified by our literature review. It is worth noting that we con-
sider the work undertaken, in this paper here, as the first step towards a more
complex and advanced game theoretic secure message delivery protocol for D2D
networks.
3 System Model
This section presents our system model and its different components. We as-
sume a multi-hop Device-to-Device (D2D) communication network that extends
a cellular network (e.g., LTE Advanced) as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Data transmission takes place in the application layer in the form of data
units called messages. Any device can be the source (s) of a message and each
message has a final destination (d). When d is not within the transmission range
of s, a route must be established to allow message delivery. Therefore, there is
an apparent need for the devices to collaborate to relay messages towards d.
We refer to the i-th mobile device by si, and define the set of all legitimate
mobile devices in a mobile network as S , {si}. When the l-th type of message,
denoted by ml, has to be delivered to a destination device (d), a route must
be chosen by s to serve that purpose. Formally, we denote route j by rj . The
6Fig. 1. Example of a D2D network.
devices on rj must forward ml towards d. We define the set of all routes from s
to d as R , {rj}, and the set of all devices that constitute rj is expressed by Sj .
We denote the set of all different types of messages5 by M. This equals
the union of the set of all malicious undetected messages (Mm), and the set
of all benign messages (Mb). Therefore, M ,Mm ∪Mb. An attack is defined
as the attempt of the attacker to harm d through the delivery of a malicious
message. When ml stays undetected prior to be delivered to d, we say that
it causes harm Hl, which is associated with the damage caused to an asset
that the device holds (e.g., data loss). We also assume that any false alarm has
loss equivalent to F . The security effectiveness of a device against a malicious
message is denoted by δ(si,ml), and it is equivalent to the detection rate of
an attack. The vector ∆(si) , 〈δ(si,m1), . . . , δ(si,mψ)〉 defines all the different
values of security effectiveness of si with regard to the different messages. For
more convenience, Table 1 summarizes the notation used in this paper.
3.1 Collaborative Detection
In our model, the aim of the devices is to detect malicious messages injected
through an entry point into the D2D network. We assume that each device
that receives a message is responsible for inspecting it by using its detection
capabilities to the best level possible. Based on the results of the detection,
the device updates the confusion matrix of the route. This is a right stochastic
matrix, which holds the probability of the different messages being detected
correctly, being confused with other messages or being identified as benign. This
matrix type was initially proposed in [28] (p. 100).
Each device that receives a message, follows exactly the same procedure until
the message arrives at d. At this point, the confusion matrix should have taken
the most accurate detection values (ideally is the identity matrix) due to all
inspections undertaken by the devices on this route. Collaborative detection of
a malicious message along a path requires forwarding state information, which
5 Very often, we use the terms types of messages, and messages interchangeably ac-
cording to the context.
7Table 1. Notation.
S Set of devices si device i
ml message l h
? Maximum possible route
length in hops
s Message source d Message destination
PA Attacker PD Defender
R Set of routes from s to d rj j-th route from s to d
Sj Set of devices on rj M Set of messages
Mm Set of malicious messages Mb Set of benign messages
δ(si,ml)
Security effectiveness of si
against ml
∆(si) Security effectiveness vector of si
σi Security energy cost of si fi Forwarding energy cost of si
i
Total message delivery en-
ergy cost of si
ej Total energy cost on rj
T
Lifetime of a Nash mes-
sage delivery plan
E Vector of energy costs, ∀ rj from s to d
hj Number of hops on rj H Vector of hops, ∀ rj from s to d
C(si) Confusion matrix of si C
(rj) Confusion matrix of rj
F False alarm loss Hl Security damage if ml undetected
ws Security cost weight wfa False alarm cost weight
we Energy cost weight wq QoS cost weight
D Payoff matrix of PD A Payoff matrix of PA
djl Utility of PD for (rj ,ml) ajl Utility of P
A for (rj ,ml)
D∗ Nash message delivery plan r∗ Nash route
includes results of the inspections previously conducted on the message. This
prevents unnecessary duplication of inspections, thus saving energy.
3.2 Device Confusion Matrix
Given the set of messages M, the linear mapping C(si):M→M describes the
detection capability of si for a message received. This capability is modeled using
a stochastic device confusion matrix as follows:
C(si) , [C(si)uv ]ψ×ψ, where 0 ≤ C(si)uv ≤ 1, ∀u, v ∈ {1, . . . , ψ}. (1)
A confusion matrix value C
(si)
uv denotes the probability of a message u being
reported as message v. If mu 6= mv, then the device confuses one message for
another. Such misinterpretation is beneficial for the attacker because the attack
associated with the message is not mitigated. If mu ∈ Mm, and mv ∈ Mb,
C
(si)
uv is the probability of the D2D network failing to report an attack. If mu ∈
Mb, and mv ∈ Mm, then C(si)uv is the probability of a false alarm. One of
the objectives of the D2D network must be the confusion matrix to become
the identify matrix (no confusion) by the time a message is delivered to d.
In another sense, if the confusion matrix is the identity matrix, every single
malicious message can be detected before it infects d. However this case is not
likely to be achieved in practice due to, for instance, 0-day vulnerabilities, and
other misclassification errors. To motivate the computation of confusion matrices
we present the following example.
Example 1. Assume S = {s1, s2}, and M = {m1, m2, m3}. Also, m1,m2 ∈
Mm, and m3 ∈ Mb. We also set the false alarm rate equal to 0.05 for both
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〈0.75, 0.6〉. We also assume that none device confuses a malicious message for
another malicious message and therefore C
(rj)
uv = 0,∀u 6= v, mu,mv ∈ Mm.
Then the devices confusion matrices are the following:
C(s1) =
 0.5 0 0.50 0.8 0.2
0.05 0.05 0.9
 , C(s2) =
0.75 0 0.250 0.6 0.4
0.05 0.05 0.9
 . (2)
3.3 Route Confusion Matrix
Similarly, given the set of messages M, the linear mapping C(rj) : M → M
describes the final detection capability of the D2D network on rj . This is the
route confusion matrix for rj derived from the confusion matrices of the devices
that constitute this route. In the problem we examine, the order of detectors
does not matter. Therefore, the confusion matrix for each combination can be
computed prior to the message delivery.
An advanced way of deriving the route confusion matrix values is to use a
boosting meta-algorithm such as Adaboost [16]. If we consider that each device
detector is a weak classifier then boosting makes classifiers focusing on data that
was previously misclassified. The underlying concept of Adaboost is that several
weak classifiers can yield a strong classifier. The confusion matrix of a route is a
representation of the weighted classifiers on the devices. It is worth mentioning
here that boosting is effective only when all devices trust each other. For the
boosting scheme to work there is a need for a broadcasting system which updates
the classifiers and pre-sets confusion matrices for the combination of detectors.
Nevertheless, such a system has to be implemented anyway for updating virus
signatures and anomaly detector parameters. Thus, the update of the classifiers
can be piggybacked on top of them.
A“naive” alternative to boosting can be a linear combination algorithm where
each device contributes linearly to the final route detection capability by some
weight determined by characteristics of the route (e.g., #hops).
3.4 Energy Costs and QoS
Each time a device receives a message it spends energy: (i) to detect any sign
of malice (security energy cost, σi) and (ii) to forward a message towards d
(forwarding energy cost, fi). The former is determined by all required intrusion
detection tasks undertaken during message inspection. The second is related to
the energy spent for relaying the message towards the next-hop on the route
from s to d. We denote by i the secure message delivery cost incurred to a
device during message delivery. Formally, we have that ∀si ∈ S : i , σi + fi.
The total route energy cost on rj , when a message is delivered over rj , is
denoted by ej, and it is derived by ej =
∑
si∈Sj i. The energy costs of all routes
between s and d are given by the vector E , 〈e1, . . . , eξ〉.
Apart from security and energy efficiency, QoS is an important consideration
when deciding upon message delivery. We denote by hj the number of hops on
rj . In this paper, we measure the QoS of a route as hj/h
?, where h? , NS − 1,
9and NS is the total number of devices in the D2D network. The number of hops
of all routes r1, . . . , rξ from s to d are given by H , 〈h1, . . . , hξ〉.
In this paper, we assume a best effort message delivery service without ac-
knowledgments. Along with having higher end-to-end delay due to this assump-
tion, as the number of hops increases the probability of a message to be lost is
higher. This is due to mobility, which is meant to be common in D2D networks.
It is worth noting here that our model does not consider real-time multime-
dia communications because they require higher bandwidth than what a typical
multi-hop D2D network provides.
3.5 Network Profiles
To allow the expression of different network profiles, we have defined an impor-
tance costs vector [ws, wfa, we, wq]. By ws, we denote the security importance
weight which accounts for the level of importance the defender gives to some
expected security damage (e.g., data theft); wfa is the importance of the false
alarm cost (i.e., cost for dropping an innocent message); we is the importance
that the defender places into the energy cost which can influence the network
lifetime and speed up network fragmentation; and wq is the importance of the
QoS for the defender which accounts for the message success delivery rate and
end-to-end delay. This vector allows the network designer to define their net-
work profile based on their requirements, measured in terms of security, energy
preservation, and QoS.
4 Secure Message Delivery Games
In this section, we use game theory to model the interactions between a D2D
network (the defender) and any adversarial entity (the attacker). The latter
aims at launching an attack against a device by sending a malicious message to
it through the network’s entry point as depicted in Fig. 1. Formally, we define
the set of players as P , {PD, PA}.
The objective of PD is to securely deliver a message to the intended desti-
nation d. By secure delivery we refer to the message being relayed through the
network and collaboratively inspected by the devices on its way to d, in order to
mitigate any security risk inflicted by PA. Therefore the security objective of PD
is to correctly detect and filter out malicious messages before they reach their
destination. Every request for message delivery to d defines a Secure Message
Delivery Game (SMDG).
4.1 Game Characterization
The SMDG is a non-cooperative two-person zero-sum game. The explanation
to the zero-sum nature of SMDG is that we have assumed that the attacker
aims at inflicting the highest possible damage to the defender. We could model
a game where the benefit of the attacker is smaller than the loss of the defender.
However, we have left this for future work along with the investigation of different
attacker profiles that are associated with different payoffs.
The defender primarily aims at delivering the message securely to d while the
attacker aims at infecting d with some malware attached to a malicious message
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as we mentioned previously. The SMDG is a repeated game since players make
their decisions once for a pair of 〈d, T 〉, where T is a predefined timeout, and d
is the destination device for which the game is played. Afterwards, they repeat
the game for either every other destination or when T expires. The value of T
may depend on the devices’ mobility. For instance, high mobility dictates small
T in order valid routes to be discovered.
In SMDG, the players make their decisions concurrently without any order
of play. However, an order of play can be imposed as an alternative where the
attacker becomes the leader and the defender the follower of a Stackelberg game.
Nevertheless, this consideration is out of the scope of this paper.
4.2 Strategies and Payoffs
The pure strategies of PD consists of all routes from s to d. Therefore, the action
set of PD is defined as AD , R = {r1, r2, . . . , rξ}. On the other hand, the pure
strategies of PA are the different messages that PA can choose to send to d. A
message can be one of the following:
{malicious1, . . . , maliciousn, harmless, surveillance} (3)
Then, the finite action set of the attacker is defined as:
AA ,M = {m1, . . . ,mψ} = {m1, . . . ,mn} ∪ {harmless, surveillance}.
We denote by Gd , 〈D,A〉 an ξ × ψ bi-matrix game where the PD (i.e., row
player) has a payoff matrix D ∈ Rξ×ψ and the payoff matrix of PA (i.e. the
column player) is denoted by A ∈ Rξ×ψ.
PD chooses as one of their pure strategies one of the rows of the payoff bi-
matrix (D,A) , (dj,l, aj,l)(rj ,ml)∈[ξ]×[ψ]. For any pair of strategies, (rj ,ml) ∈
[ξ]× [ψ], PD, PA have payoff values equivalent to dj,l and aj,l, respectively. The
payoff of the defender for a given pair of players’ pure strategies (rj ,ml) follows:
UD(rj ,ml) , dj,l , −ws(1− C(rj)ll )Hl − wfa(1− C(rj)ll )F − weej − wqhj . (4)
Generally, the first term is the expected security damage (e.g., data theft) in-
flicted by the attacker due to malicious messages being undetected while the
second term expresses the expected cost of the defender due to false alarms.
This accounts for benign messages that are dropped due to being detected as
malicious. The next to last term is the energy cost of the defender when mes-
sage delivery takes place over rj while the last term expresses the expected QoS
experienced on this route. Since players act independently, we can enlarge the
strategy spaces, so as to allow the players to base their decisions on the outcome
of random events. Therefore we consider the mixed strategies of both PD and
PA. The mixed strategy D , [q1, . . . , qξ] of the defender is a probability distribu-
tion over the different routes from s to d, where qj is the probability of delivering
a message via rj . We refer to a mixed strategy of P
D as the message delivery
plan. On the other hand, the attacker’s mixed strategy A , [p1, . . . , pψ] is a
probability distribution over the different messages, where pl is the probability
of choosing ml.
When considering mixed strategies, the defender’s objective is quantified by
the utility function:
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UD(D,A) =
ξ∑
j=1
ψ∑
l=1
qjdj,l pl = −ws[
∑
ml∈Mm
∑
rj∈R
qj (1− C(rj)ll ) plHl] −
wfa [
∑
ml∈Mb
∑
rj∈R
qj (1− C(rj)ll ) pl F ] − weDET − wqDHT , (5)
where j ∈ {1, . . . , ξ}, l ∈ {1, . . . , ψ}.
Because SMDG is a zero-sum game, the attacker’s utility is given by UA(D,A) =
−UD(D,A). This can be interpreted as, the attacker can cause the maximum
damage to the defender.
4.3 Nash Equilibrium
SMDG is a two-person zero-sum game with finite number of actions for both
players, and according to Nash [20] it admits at least a Nash Equilibrium (NE)
in mixed strategies. Saddle-points correspond to Nash equilibria as discussed
in [28] (p. 42).
The following result, from [14], establishes the existence of a saddle (equilib-
rium) solution in the games we examine and summarizes their properties.
Theorem 1 (Saddle point of the SMDG). The Secure Message Delivery
Game defined admits a saddle point in mixed strategies, (D∗,A∗), with the prop-
erty that
D∗ = arg max
D
min
A
UD(D,A), ∀A and A∗ = arg max
A
min
D
UA(D,A), ∀D.
Then, due to the zero-sum nature of the game the following holds:
max
D
min
A
UD(D,A) = min
A
max
D
UD(D,A).
The pair of saddle point strategies (D∗,A∗) are at the same time security strate-
gies for the players, i.e., they ensure a minimum performance regardless of the
actions of the other. Furthermore, if the game admits multiple saddle points
(and strategies), they have the ordered interchangeability property, i.e., the player
achieves the same performance level independent from the other player’s choice
of saddle point strategy.
Our results can be extended to non-zero sum, bi-matrix games. In the latter
case, the existence of a NE is also guaranteed, but the additional properties hold
only in the case where the attacker’s utility is a positive affine transformation
(PAT) of the defender’s utility.
Definition 1. The Nash message delivery plan, denoted by D∗, is the probability
distribution over the different routes, as determined by the NE of the SMDG.
The minimax theorem states that for zero sum games NE and minimax
solutions coincide. Therefore, D∗ = arg minDmaxA UA(D,A). This means that
regardless of the strategy the attacker chooses, the Nash message delivery plan
is the defender’s security strategy that guarantees a minimum performance.
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We can convert the original matrix game into a linear programming (LP)
problem and make use of some of the powerful algorithms available for LP to
derive the equilibrium. For a given mixed strategy D of PD, PA can cause
a maximum damage to PD by injecting a message m̂ into the D2D network.
In that case, the utility of PD is minimized and it is denoted by UD(D, m̂)
(i.e.,UminD = UD(D, m̂)). Formally, P
D seeks to solve the following LP:
max
D
UD(D, m̂ )
subject to

UD(D,m1)− UD(D, m̂)e ≥ 0
...
UD(D,mψ)− UD(D, m̂)e ≥ 0
De = 1
D ≥ 0
⇒

∑ξ
j=1 qjdj,1 − UD(D, m̂)e ≥ 0
...∑ξ
j=1 qjdj,ψ − UD(D, m̂)e ≥ 0
De = 1
D ≥ 0
In this problem, e is a vector of ones of size ξ.
5 The Secure Message Delivery Protocol
In this section, we present the Secure Message Delivery (SMD) routing protocol
whose routing decisions are taken according to the Nash message delivery plan.
SMD increases security in a D2D network by mitigating the risk of adversaries
harming legitimate devices via, for instance, malware attached to messages. SMD
has been designed based on the mathematical findings of the SMDG and its main
goal is to maximize UD(D,A).
According to SMD, each time a request for message delivery to d is issued,
s has to compute the Nash message delivery plan by solving an SMDG for this
destination. To this end, the device uses its latest information about confusion
matrices, QoS and energy costs. Then, the message is relayed and collaboratively
inspected by the devices on its way to d. The objective of the network (i.e., PD)
is to correctly detect and filter out malicious messages before they infect d.
5.1 SMD Considerations
The SMD protocol takes routing decisions that increase the probability of detect-
ing malicious messages. Apart from security, SMD utilizes standard approaches
to take into account (i) the energy costs resulting from message forwarding and
inspection, and (ii) the QoS of the chosen route. According to SMD, the devices
maintain routing tables with at least three metrics per route:
– the route confusion matrix,
– the total expected energy cost on this route and,
– the shortest path in terms of number of hops (i.e., QoS).
If the only factor affecting the routing decision was security, then the route with
the highest detection capability would be always chosen. This would result to
a faster depletion of this route’s energy as opposed to when a combination of
different routes is chosen. Consequently, the D2D network would suffer fragmen-
tation across the entire topology and consequently security would be reduced.
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This is the motivation behind considering energy costs upon path selection. Nev-
ertheless, while the shortage of a device’s battery can be solved by, for example,
by using mobile solar cells as discussed in [4], and QoS might not be so much of a
concern for message communications, secure message delivery remains a critical
issue.
The formulation of the defender’s utility function allows a device to decide
how important the expected QoS and energy costs are compared to the expected
security damage. For instance, the defender can decide to set the energy costs
equal to 0 when a constant source of energy supply is available or to give a higher
importance to security losses than QoS.
Due to the best effort nature of the communications (as a result of the multi-
hop environment) the higher the number of hops (i.e., QoS) of a route the more
likely a message is to be lost during its delivery via that route. QoS accounts
for a successful message delivery rate and therefore the defender might never
really want to ignore it. In general, SMD allows network designers to customize
the protocol based on the network profile of the D2D network. In any case, all
defender’s preferences are reflected to the Nash message delivery plan.
5.2 Routing
Getting inspired by the functionalities of the well-known Dynamic Source Rout-
ing (DSR) [25] routing protocol, SMD consists of two main stages.
SMD - Stage I. In the first stage, s broadcasts a Route REQuest (RREQd)
to discover routes towards d. Each device that receives a RREQd acts similarly
by broadcasting it towards d and caches relevant information (i.e., originator of
the request, ID of the RREQd). When d receives a RREQd, it prepares the RREPd
and sends it back towards s by using the reverse route which is built during
the delivery of RREQd to d. Each RREPd carries information about the route. This
information includes the route confusion matrix (E1), the total energy costs due
to inspection and forwarding on this route (E2), and the total number of hops
(E3). All three fields are updated while the RREPd is traveling back to s.
Each device, involved in route discovery, that receives RREPd, it updates E1
by using boosting (e.g., Adaboost) or simply a linear combination algorithm
without learning features. The same device (e.g., si) updates E2 by adding its
total energy cost i to the route energy cost. Lastly, E3 is increased by 1 in every
hop from s to d.
According to SMD, after s sends a RREQd it has to await for some timeout
Treq. Within this period s aggregates RREPd messages and updates its routing
table with information from those messages.
SMD - Stage II. In the second stage, s uses its routing table to solve the
SMDG by computing the Nash message delivery plan D∗. The latter has a
lifetime equivalent to T , as defined earlier. Then, s probabilistically selects a
route according to D∗ to deliver the message to d. The chosen route is called
the Nash route and it is denoted by r∗. Note that for the same d and before
T expires, s uses the same D∗ to derive r∗, upon a message delivery request.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the main SMD functionalities.
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It is worth noting here that the complexity of the SMD protocol measured
in terms of the number of messages exchanged in performing route discovery is
O(2NS), where NS is the total number of devices in the D2D network.
Data: s, d,ml
Result: ml delivered
Stage 1:
s seeks for a route to d by broadcasting RREQd
if device si receives RREQd then
if si 6= d then
s← si
Execute Algorithm 1
else
Send an RREPd back towards s using the reverse route rj
end
end
Stage 2:
if device si receives RREPd then
if si 6= s then
Update C(rj), ej, hj
Attach 〈C(rj), ej, hj〉 to the RREPd
Relay RREPd back towards s
else
Cache 〈C(rj), ej, hj〉 to the routing table
break;
end
end
s: Derive the Nash message delivery plan D∗
s: Choose r∗ probabilistically as dictated by D∗
s: Deliver ml to d over r
?
Algorithm 1: SMD Stages.
6 Performance Evaluation
6.1 Simulation Parameters
In this section, we evaluate the performance of SMD by simulating 30 devices and
6 routes between s and d. The number of devices per route is selected randomly
and the maximum number of devices per route has been set to 10. The number
of malicious messages vary from 2 to 20 with an incremental step of 2.
We consider different network profiles to assess the performance of the SMD
protocol. Note here that the network profile refers to the preference of the D2D
network in terms of security (i.e., risk appetite), QoS (i.e., delay in message de-
livery), energy cost (i.e., spent for message inspection and message forwarding),
and false alarm (probability of dropping benign messages) as determined by the
cost importance vector.
We have used a uniform random generator to create the security effective-
ness values for all devices. From these values the simulator creates all devices’
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confusion matrices. Then, we derive the route confusion matrices by using the
Algorithm 2. Note that Algorithm 2 is executed by each device at the step of
Algorithm 1 where C(rj) is updated. This is a linear algorithm (less efficient
than boosting due to lack of learning features) which allows us to get some pre-
liminary results about the performance of SMD. This algorithm implements a
weighted method according to which each device contributes to the route security
effectiveness by
(Device security effectiveness) × (1/Maximum number of hops in the network).
The final route detection capability not only depends on the detection capa-
bility of each device on the route but also on the number of devices. As a result
of this, the longer a route is the better its final security effectiveness.
After the route confusion matrices have been derived, the simulator computes
the Nash message delivery plan for each of the network profiles presented in Table
2. We evaluate the performance of SMD by measuring the defender’s expected
cost when s uses SMD instead of a shortest path routing protocol. According to
the latter, s chooses the path with the minimum number of hops to d. For each
message delivery and protocol used we compute the defender’s total expected
cost which includes security, false alarm, energy and QoS costs.
Table 2. The importance cost vectors used in our simulations.
Network Profile ws wfa we wq Network Profile ws wfa we wq
Security 10 0.5 0 0
Security & Energy
Efficiency
5 0.5 5 0
Security & QoS 5 0.5 0 5
Security & QoS &
Energy Efficiency
4 0.5 3 2.5
We have considered 10 Cases each representing a different attacker’s action
set akin to different number of available malicious messages namely; 2, 4, . . . , 20.
For each Case we have simulated 1,000 message deliveries for a fixed network
topology and we refer to the run of the code for the pair 〈Case,#message
deliveries〉 by the term Experiment. We have repeated each Experiment for 25
independent network topologies to compute the standard deviation. We do that
for all 10 Cases and each type of attacker profile.
In this paper we consider 2 different attacker profiles; Uniform and Nash. A
Uniform attacker chooses any of the available messages with the same probability
whilst a Nash attacker plays the attack mixed strategy given by the NE of the
SMDG. Therefore, we have totally simulated
10 (Cases) × 1,000 (Message deliveries) × 25 (Runs of each experiment) × 2
(Attacker profiles) = 500,000 Message deliveries.
Per message delivery, the simulator chooses an attack sample from the attack
probability distribution which is determined by the attacker profile. The simula-
tor aggregates the cost values of each Experiment for both SMD and the shortest
path routing protocol.
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Data: C(si), C(rj)
Result: Updated C
(rj)
uv
for u ∈M do
for v ∈M do
if u ∈Mm then
if v == u then
C
(rj)
uv ← C(si)uv /h? + C(rj)uv
end
if v ∈Mb then
C
(rj)
uv ← 1− C(rj)uu
else
// probability a malicious message u to be
confused with another malicious message
C
(rj)
uv ← 0
end
end
if u ∈Mb then
if v /∈Mb then
// fa: device false alarm rate
C
(rj)
uv ← fa/h? + C(rj)uv
froutea ← C(rj)uv
else
// froutea : route false alarm rate
C
(rj)
uv ← 1− froutea
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 2: How a device si updates the route confusion matrix.
6.2 Simulation Results
We have plotted the improvement on the total expected defender’s cost when
SMD is chosen as opposed to the shortest path routing protocol. The plots
illustrate different number of available malicious messages, attacker profiles and
importance cost vectors, in Figures 2 and 3.
From both figures we notice that SMD outperforms the shortest path routing
protocol with the highest improvement to be achieved under the “Security” net-
work profile. From Fig. 2 we notice that the average values of this improvement
fluctuate approximately within the range [30%, 43%]. The second best perfor-
mance is achieved under the “Security & QoS” network profile and it is only
slightly better than the improvement we get under the “Security and Energy
Efficiency” profile. The lowest improvement is noticed under the “Security &
QoS & Energy Efficiency” network profile with the mean values to be within
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Fig. 2. Simulation results in presence of a uniform attacker.
the range [10%, 18%]. We notice the same trends for a Nash attacker as illus-
trated in Fig. 3. One difference in the results is that under the network pro-
file Security & QoS the difference in improvement compared to the Security
& Energy Efficiency is more pronounced as opposed to the scenarios with a
Nash attacker. We also notice that for all network profiles SMD improves the de-
fender’s expected cost in a greater degree in the presence of a Uniform Attacker
rather than a Nash attacker although the defender chooses the Nash routing
plan in either cases (since it minimizes the maximum potential cost inflicted by
the attacker). This is due to the attacker maximizing the minimum defender’s
expected cost at the NE as stated in Theorem 1. On the other hand, the uniform
attacker follows a naive distribution to inject different messages into the D2D
network and therefore achieving a worse performance than the Nash attacker.
As a generic comment, the more focused objectives SMD has the higher the
improvement of the defender’s expected cost is, compared to a shortest path
protocol. We also notice that the standard deviation is large in all Experiments.
This can be explained by looking at the results from the different Experiments in
more detail. By doing so, we noticed that occasionally the same routes are chosen
by both SMD and the shortest path routing protocol. This can be explained by
the number of available routes being only 6 in our simulations here. The generic
trends demonstrate the improvement that SMD introduces even without the
use of a boosting algorithm. These preliminary results are promising and we
have plans for further investigations when a boosting algorithm (e.g., Adaboost)
is used and a larger number of devices and routes are given. In addition, we
are planning to examine different mobility levels and see how these affect the
expected defender’s cost under different network profiles with SMD.
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Fig. 3. Simulation results in presence of a Nash attacker.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated secure message delivery for device-to-device
networks in a hostile environment with possible malicious behavior. We have
formulated Secure Message Delivery Games (SMDGs) to study the interactions
between the defender (i.e., device-to-device network), and different adversaries,
which are abstracted by the player called attacker. The defender seeks the “best
route” to deliver a message from a source device to a destination device whilst
the latter aims to harm the destination with mobile malware attached to a
message. The defender solves an SMDG to derive the Nash message delivery plan
(i.e., Nash mixed strategy). Then, the defender probabilistically chooses a route
according to this plan and delivers the message to the destination. Due to the
multi-hop nature of the network, intermediate devices relay the message towards
the destination. Apart from forwarding, the relaying devices are responsible for
the inspection of the message to identify malicious signs and therefore providing
security for the D2D message communications.
We have proposed the Secure Message Delivery (SMD) routing protocol
which takes routing decisions according to the Nash message delivery plan. Apart
from security, the protocol respects energy costs and end-to-end delay with the
ability to be customized to consider each objective at a different degree. We
have undertaken simulations to show how much SMD improves the defender’s
expected utility compared to a shortest path routing protocol. We believe this
improvement will be more pronounced when we implement boosting techniques
for the computation of the final intrusion detection capabilities (i.e., confusion
matrices) of the routes. We have also plans to take into account the remaining
energy of each route in the utility function of the defender, and investigate the
impact of mobility to the results. Lastly, future work will consider a network-
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wide extension of the per-message game where the attacker aims to spread a
mobile malware while the defender is attempting to stop it.
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